Divine foreknowledge and human freedom : the coherence of theism : omniscience /
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Leiden ; New York :
E.J. Brill,
1991.
|
| Series: | Brill's studies in intellectual history ;
v. 19. |
| Subjects: | |
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| LEADER | 04816cam a22003618a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 001982107-7 | ||
| 005 | 20020606093309.7 | ||
| 008 | 900622s1991 ne d b 00110 eng | ||
| 010 | |a 90042346 | ||
| 020 | |a 9004092501 (cloth) | ||
| 035 | 0 | |a ocn213302425 | |
| 035 | 0 | |a ocm22006341 | |
| 040 | |a DLC |c DLC |d BHA | ||
| 050 | 0 | 0 | |a BT131 |b .C69 1991 |
| 082 | 0 | 0 | |a 212/.7 |2 20 |
| 100 | 1 | |a Craig, William Lane. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Divine foreknowledge and human freedom : |b the coherence of theism : omniscience / |c by William Lane Craig. |
| 260 | 0 | |a Leiden ; |a New York : |b E.J. Brill, |c 1991. | |
| 300 | |a xiii, 360 p. : |b charts ; |c 25 cm. | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Brill's studies in intellectual history, |x 0920-8607 ; |v v. 19 | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. [337]-353) and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a I. Theological fatalism -- A.N. Prior -- Nelson Pike -- II. Reduction of theological to logical fatalism -- III. Logical fatalism -- Richard Taylor -- Taylor's response to his critics -- IV. Suggested escapes from fatalism -- Denial of the principle of bivalence or the law of excluded middle -- Status of the principle of bivalence -- Grounds for denying bivalence of future contingent propositions -- Grounds for affirming bivalence of future contingent propositions -- Bivalence of all propositions -- Falsity of all future contingent propositions -- Logical form of future contingent propositions -- Unidentifiability of future individuals -- Timelessness of truth -- Tensed vs. tenseless truth-bearers -- Omnitemporal vs. atemporal truth -- Conclusion -- V. "Within one's power" -- Taylor on "within one's power" -- Necessitas consequentiae and personal power -- Conditions and consequences -- Fatalism about the past vs. fatalism about the future -- | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Changing the past vs. changing the future -- Causing the future vs. causing the past -- VI. Backward causation -- part I: The alleged logical impossibility of retro-causation -- Dummett's defense of backward causation -- The logical objection to backward causation -- Antony Flew -- Michael Scriven -- Richard Gale -- Richard Swinburne -- Assessment of the logical objection -- Two words of caution -- Assessment -- Logical and metaphysical modality -- Part II: Purported instances of retro-causation -- Neural physiology -- Particle pair creation/annihilation -- Classical electrodynamics -- Tachyons -- Superluminal particles and backward causation -- The reinterpretation principle -- The logically pernicious self-inhibitor -- A perspectival special theory of relativity -- Precognition -- Experimental evidence -- Retro-causal explanation -- Difficulties in retro-causal explanation -- Time travel -- A word of caution -- The possibility of time travel -- Stock objections to time travel -- | |
| 505 | 0 | |a The logically pernicious self-inhibitor -- Circular causation -- Part III: The metaphysical impossibility of retro-causation -- The A-theory and backward causation -- Superiority of the A-theory -- Application to purported instances of backward causation -- Conclusion | |
| 505 | 0 | |a VII. "Within one's power" once more -- Power and counterfactual openness -- Failure of fatalism -- Conclusion -- VIII. Transition to theological fatalism -- Prior -- Pike -- Conclusion -- IX. Temporal necessity -- Contemporary debate from Pike to Plantinga -- John Turk Saunders vs. Nelson Pike -- Marilyn Adams -- John Fischer -- Alfred J. Freddoso -- Alvin Plantinga -- Assessment of the debate -- Toward understanding temporal necessity -- Backward causation and intuitions of the past's necessity -- Fatalism and ability -- Conclusion -- X. Newcomb's paradox -- The puzzle conditions -- Theological implications -- Nozick's dilemma -- Divine foreknowledge and the one-box strategy -- Objections to the one-box strategy -- Backward causation -- Backtracking counterfactuals -- Newcomb's paradox and freedom -- Conclusion -- XI. Foreknowledge and freedom of God -- Foreknowledge and human deliberation -- Foreknowledge and divine deliberation -- Conclusion -- XII. The basis of divine foreknowledge -- God's ability to know future contingents -- Knowledge vs. true belief -- Conclusion -- XIII. Middle knowledge -- The doctrine of middle knowledge -- Natural, middle, and free knowledge -- Theological ramifications -- Grounds for affirming middle knowledge -- Objections to middle knowledge -- Middle knowledge and passivity in God -- Middle knowledge and divine freedom -- Conclusion -- Appendix I: Is the special theory of relativity fatalistic? | |
| 650 | 0 | |a God |x Omniscience. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Free will and determinism. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Theism. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a God (Christianity) |x Omniscience. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Future contingents (Logic) | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Brill's studies in intellectual history ; |v v. 19. |x 0920-8607 | |
| 988 | |a 20020608 | ||
| 906 | |0 DLC | ||