Game theory /

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Fudenberg, Drew.
Other Authors: Tirole, Jean.
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1991.
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008 910204s1991 maua b 00110 eng
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020 |a 0262061414 (hc) 
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040 |a DLC  |c DLC  |d DLC 
050 0 0 |a HB144  |b .F83 1991 
082 0 0 |a 658.4/0353  |2 20 
100 1 |a Fudenberg, Drew. 
245 1 0 |a Game theory /  |c Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole. 
260 |a Cambridge, Mass. :  |b MIT Press,  |c c1991. 
300 |a xxiii, 579 p. :  |b ill. ;  |c 27 cm. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0 0 |g I.  |t Static games of complete information --  |g 1.  |t Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium --  |g 2.  |t Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium --  |g II.  |t Dynamic games of complete information --  |g 3.  |t Extensive-form games --  |g 4.  |t Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions --  |g 5.  |t Repeated games --  |g III.  |t Static games of incomplete information --  |g 6.  |t Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium --  |g 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design --  |g IV.  |t Dynamic games of incomplete information --  |g 8.  |t Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection --  |g 9.  |t Reputation effects --  |g 10.  |t Sequential bargining under incomplete information --  |g V.  |t Advanced topics --  |g 11.  |t More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, in iterated weak dominance --  |g 12.  |t Advanced topics in strategic-form games --  |g 13.  |t Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium --  |g 14.  |t Common knowledge and games --  |t Index. 
650 0 |a Game theory. 
650 0 |a Economics, Mathematical. 
700 1 |a Tirole, Jean. 
988 |a 20020608 
906 |0 DLC