Betting on theories /
"This book is a major new contribution to decision theory, focusing on the question of when it is rational to accept scientific theories." "The author examines both Bayesian decision theory and confirmation theory, refining and elaborating the views of Ramsey and Savage. He argues tha...
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| 主要作者: | |
|---|---|
| 格式: | 图书 |
| 语言: | English |
| 出版: |
Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA :
Cambridge University Press,
1993.
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| 丛编: | Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory.
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| LEADER | 04033pam a2200289 a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 002933209-5 | ||
| 005 | 20020606093309.7 | ||
| 008 | 920326s1993 enka b 001 0 eng | ||
| 010 | |a 92013817 | ||
| 020 | |a 052141850X | ||
| 035 | 0 | |a ocm25675444 | |
| 040 | |a DLC |c DLC |d DLC | ||
| 050 | 0 | 0 | |a QA279.4 |b .M33 1993 |
| 082 | 0 | 0 | |a 519.5/42 |2 20 |
| 100 | 1 | |a Maher, Patrick. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Betting on theories / |c Patrick Maher. |
| 260 | |a Cambridge ; |a New York, NY, USA : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 1993. | ||
| 300 | |a xii, 309 p. : |b ill. ; |c 24 cm. | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. 292-305) and index. | ||
| 505 | 2 | |a 1. The logic of preference -- 1.1. Expected utility -- 1.2. Calculation -- 1.3. Representation -- 1.4. Preference -- 1.5. Connectedness -- 1.6. Normality -- 1.7. Rationality -- 1.8. Justification -- 1.9. Qualification -- 2. Transitivity and normality -- 2.1. Popular endorsement -- 2.2. Arguments for transitivity and normality -- 2.3. Objections to transitivity and normality -- 2.4. Hume and McClennen -- 3. Independence -- 3.1. Violations -- 3.2. Arguments for independence -- 3.3. Objections to independence -- 3.4. Conclusion -- 4. Subjective probability in science -- 4.1. Confirmation -- 4.2. Normativity -- 4.3. Betting on theories -- 4.4. Subjectivity -- 4.5. Empiricism -- 4.6. The Dutch book argument for probability -- 5. Diachronic rationality -- 5.1. Reflection -- 5.2. Conditionalization -- 5.3. Probability kinematics -- 5.4. Conclusion -- 6. The concept of acceptance -- 6.1. Definition -- 6.2. Acceptance and probability -- 6.3. Rational acceptance -- 6.4. Acceptance and action -- 6.5. Belief -- 6.6. Other concepts of acceptance -- 6.7. Summary -- 7. The significance of acceptance -- 7.1. Explaining the history of science -- 7.2. The role of alternative hypotheses -- 7.3. The scientific value of evidence -- 7.4. Summary -- 8. Representation theorem -- 8.1. Savage's uninterpretable acts -- 8.2. Simple cognitive expected utility -- 8.3. General cognitive expected utility -- 9. Scientific values -- 9.1. Truth -- 9.2. Necessary conditions -- 9.3. Value incommensurability -- 9.4. Verisimilitude -- 9.5. Information and distance from truth -- 9.6. Scientific realism -- App. A Proof for Section 5.1.6 -- App. B Proof of Theorem 8.1 -- B.1. Probability -- B.2. Utility of gambles -- B.3. Utility of consequences -- App. C Sufficient conditions for Axiom 10 -- App. D Proof of Theorem 8.2 -- D.1. Countable additivity of probability -- D.2. The function w -- D.3. The signed measures w[subscript f] -- D.4. Utility on Y -- D.5. The need for Axiom 11. | |
| 520 | 1 | |a "This book is a major new contribution to decision theory, focusing on the question of when it is rational to accept scientific theories." "The author examines both Bayesian decision theory and confirmation theory, refining and elaborating the views of Ramsey and Savage. He argues that the most solid foundations for confirmation theory are to be found in decision theory, and he provides a decision-theoretic derivation of principles for how new probabilities should be revised over time. Professor Maher defines a notion of accepting a hypothesis, and then shows that it is not reducible to probability and that it is needed to deal with some important questions in the philosophy of science. A Bayesian decision-theoretic account of rational acceptance is provided, together with a proof of the foundations for this theory. A final chapter shows how this account can be used to cast light on such vexed issues as verisimilitude and scientific realism." "This is a book of critical importance to all philosophers of science and epistemologists, as well as to decision theorists in economics and other branches of the social sciences."--BOOK JACKET. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Decision making. | |
| 650 | 2 | |a Decision Making. | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory. | |
| 988 | |a 20020608 | ||
| 906 | |0 DLC | ||