The principle of marginal deterrence in torts : the potentially perverse effects of stiffer tort penalties and higher taxes /
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| Main Author: | Knoll, Michael S. |
|---|---|
| Corporate Author: | University of Southern California. Law School. |
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Los Angeles, CA :
University of Southern California Law School,
[1997]
|
| Series: | Working paper series (University of Southern California. Law School) ;
no. 97-18. |
| Subjects: | |
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