The two selves : their metaphysical commitments and functional independence /
Klein takes the position that the self is not a 'thing' easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists of a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construe...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York :
Oxford University Press,
[2014]
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| Subjects: | |
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| Summary: | Klein takes the position that the self is not a 'thing' easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists of a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. |
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| Physical Description: | xx, 153 pages ; 22 cm |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 127-148) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780199349968 (hardcover) 0199349967 (hardcover) |