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Federal Politics and Budget Deficits : Evidence from the States of India

This paper tests two predictions implied by models of the common-pool game in federations where subnational governments are more likely to have higher deficits because they do not internalize the macroeconomic effects of fiscal profligacy. The firs...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Khemani, Stuti
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
BORROWING
BUDGET DEFICITS
BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS
CABINET OF MINISTERS
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
CENTRAL TRANSFERS
COALITIONS
CONSERVATISM
CONSTITUENCIES
CONSTITUENCY
CONSTITUTION
DEBT
DECENTRALIZATION
DEMOCRACY
DISTRICTS
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMIC REFORM
ECONOMIC SHOCKS
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURE
EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES
EXTERNALITIES
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
FEDERALISM
FEDERATIONS
FISCAL
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL DEFICIT
FISCAL DEFICITS
FISCAL DISCIPLINE
FISCAL FEDERALISM
FISCAL POLICIES
FISCAL POLICY
FISCAL PROBLEMS
GOVERNMENT SPENDING
GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS
INSURANCE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES
LEGISLATURE
LEGISLATURES
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL SPENDING
LOWER HOUSE
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
MINISTERS
NATIONAL ELECTIONS
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
NATIONAL LEVEL
PARTY AFFILIATION
POLITICAL CONTROL
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FINANCE
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC RESOURCES
PUBLIC SPENDING
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
STATE FISCAL POLICY
STATE GOVERNMENT
STATE INCOME
SUBNATIONAL DEFICITS
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
TAX
VOTING
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19248
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19248

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