Lectures in industrial organization theory /
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford [England] ; Cambridge, Mass :
Blackwell,
1993.
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| Subjects: | |
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| LEADER | 02919nam a22002778a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 002712372-3 | ||
| 005 | 20020606093309.7 | ||
| 008 | 920205s1993 enka b 001 0 eng | ||
| 010 | |a 92007707 | ||
| 020 | |a 1557861110 (hb) | ||
| 020 | |a 1557863431 (pbk.) | ||
| 035 | 0 | |a ocm25368858 | |
| 040 | |a DLC |c DLC | ||
| 050 | 0 | 0 | |a HD2326 |b .B373 1993 |
| 082 | 0 | 0 | |a 338.6 |2 20 |
| 100 | 1 | |a Basu, Kaushik. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Lectures in industrial organization theory / |c Kaushik Basu. |
| 260 | |a Oxford [England] ; |a Cambridge, Mass : |b Blackwell, |c 1993. | ||
| 300 | |a x, 236 p. : |b ill. ; |c 24 cm. | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and indexes. | ||
| 505 | 2 | |a 1. Introduction -- 1.1. Origins -- 1.2. Prospectus -- 2. Game Theory: Normal-Form Games -- 2.2. Nash equilibrium -- 2.3. A refinement of Nash: perfection -- 2.4. A coarsening of Nash: rationalizability -- 3. The Standard Market Structures -- 3.2. Monopoly -- 3.3. Competition -- 3.4. Oligopoly -- 3.5. Dominant firms and fringes -- 4. Oligopoly and Some Non-Cournot Equilibria -- 4.2. Rationalizability and oligopoly -- 4.3. Bertrand equilibrium and the Edgeworth indeterminacy -- 5. Nonlinear Pricing -- 5.2. Two-part tariffs -- 5.3. Monopoly and efficiency -- 5.4. Nonlinear pricing -- 5.5. Tie-ins, clusters and interlinkage -- 6. Quality -- 6.2. Quality hierarchies -- 6.3. Strategic substitutes and complements -- 6.4. Quality, status and market disequilibria -- 7. Durability -- 7.2. Durability under monopoly and competition -- 7.3. Durable goods: renting and selling -- 8. Location, Brands and Advertising -- 8.2. Location -- 8.3. Brand proliferation -- 8.4. Advertising -- | |
| 505 | 2 | |a 9. Game Theory: Extensive-Form Games -- 9.2. The idea of perfection in extensive games -- 9.3. Repeated games and trigger strategies -- 9.4. Simple strategy profiles -- 9.5. Critiques, refinements and extensions -- 10. Oligopoly in the Extensive Form: Two Examples -- 10.2. The two fishermen -- 10.3. Towards collusion -- 11. Quantities and Prices -- 11.2. First quantity, then price -- 11.3. Quick-response oligopoly -- 11.4. Supply functions equilibria -- 12. Collusion -- 12.2. Some legal issues -- 12.3. Infinitely repeated oligopoly -- 12.4. Finitely repeated oligopoly -- 12.5. Extensions -- 13. Entry Deterrence -- 13.2. Capacity, investment and deterrence -- 13.3. Chain stores and reputations -- 13.4. Sequential entry -- 14. Managerial Incentives -- 14.2. The incentive equilibrium -- 14.3. Extensions and critiques -- 15. Switching Costs -- 15.2. A formal model -- 15.3. Switching costs and rural credit -- 15.4. Captive segment conditions and profit -- 16. Government Intervention -- | |
| 505 | 2 | |a 16.2. Mixed oligopoly -- 16.3. Partly state-owned firms and entry barriers -- 16.4. Pigouvian interventions -- 16.5. The state and the law: some open issues. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Industrial organization (Economic theory) | |
| 988 | |a 20020608 | ||
| 906 | |0 DLC | ||