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Lectures in industrial organization theory /

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Basu, Kaushik.
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Oxford [England] ; Cambridge, Mass : Blackwell, 1993.
Subjects:
Industrial organization (Economic theory)
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Table of Contents:
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. Origins
  • 1.2. Prospectus
  • 2. Game Theory: Normal-Form Games
  • 2.2. Nash equilibrium
  • 2.3. A refinement of Nash: perfection
  • 2.4. A coarsening of Nash: rationalizability
  • 3. The Standard Market Structures
  • 3.2. Monopoly
  • 3.3. Competition
  • 3.4. Oligopoly
  • 3.5. Dominant firms and fringes
  • 4. Oligopoly and Some Non-Cournot Equilibria
  • 4.2. Rationalizability and oligopoly
  • 4.3. Bertrand equilibrium and the Edgeworth indeterminacy
  • 5. Nonlinear Pricing
  • 5.2. Two-part tariffs
  • 5.3. Monopoly and efficiency
  • 5.4. Nonlinear pricing
  • 5.5. Tie-ins, clusters and interlinkage
  • 6. Quality
  • 6.2. Quality hierarchies
  • 6.3. Strategic substitutes and complements
  • 6.4. Quality, status and market disequilibria
  • 7. Durability
  • 7.2. Durability under monopoly and competition
  • 7.3. Durable goods: renting and selling
  • 8. Location, Brands and Advertising
  • 8.2. Location
  • 8.3. Brand proliferation
  • 8.4. Advertising
  • 9. Game Theory: Extensive-Form Games
  • 9.2. The idea of perfection in extensive games
  • 9.3. Repeated games and trigger strategies
  • 9.4. Simple strategy profiles
  • 9.5. Critiques, refinements and extensions
  • 10. Oligopoly in the Extensive Form: Two Examples
  • 10.2. The two fishermen
  • 10.3. Towards collusion
  • 11. Quantities and Prices
  • 11.2. First quantity, then price
  • 11.3. Quick-response oligopoly
  • 11.4. Supply functions equilibria
  • 12. Collusion
  • 12.2. Some legal issues
  • 12.3. Infinitely repeated oligopoly
  • 12.4. Finitely repeated oligopoly
  • 12.5. Extensions
  • 13. Entry Deterrence
  • 13.2. Capacity, investment and deterrence
  • 13.3. Chain stores and reputations
  • 13.4. Sequential entry
  • 14. Managerial Incentives
  • 14.2. The incentive equilibrium
  • 14.3. Extensions and critiques
  • 15. Switching Costs
  • 15.2. A formal model
  • 15.3. Switching costs and rural credit
  • 15.4. Captive segment conditions and profit
  • 16. Government Intervention
  • 16.2. Mixed oligopoly
  • 16.3. Partly state-owned firms and entry barriers
  • 16.4. Pigouvian interventions
  • 16.5. The state and the law: some open issues.

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