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Competition, collusion, and game theory

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Telser, Lester G., 1931-
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Chicago, Aldine·Atherton [1972]
Series:Aldine treatises in modern economics
Subjects:
Competition > Mathematical models.
Prices > Mathematical models.
Price fixing > Mathematical models.
Game theory.
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040 |a DLC  |c DLC  |d HBS 
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100 1 |a Telser, Lester G.,  |d 1931- 
245 1 0 |a Competition, collusion, and game theory  |c [by] Lester G. Telser. 
260 |a Chicago,  |b Aldine·Atherton  |c [1972] 
300 |a xix, 380 p.  |b illus.  |c 25 cm. 
490 0 |a Aldine treatises in modern economics 
504 |a Bibliography: p. 367-370. 
505 0 |a Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- APPLICATIONS OF CORE THEORY MARKET ExCHANGE -- l. -- 2. Consumer Surplus and Transforable Utility -- 3. Some Simple Trading Situations -- 4. Owners and n Nonowners -- 5. The Basic Core Constraints -- 6. Market Efficiency and Honest Brokers -- 7. Multiunit Trade -- 8. Increasing Returns and Public Goods from the Viewpoint of the Core -- 9. A Brief Historical Note -- Appendix: Consumer Surplus -- II. FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF CORE THEORY TO MARKET EXCHANGE -- I. Introduction -- 2. Balanced Collections of Coalitions -- -3. Empty Cores -- 4. The Feasibility of Trade -- 5. Group Rationality with Multiunit Trade -- 6. Competition and Numbers -- 7. The Number of Traders and the Emptiness of the Core -- 8. Conclusions -- III. APPLICATIONS OF THE CORE TO OLIGOPOLY -- I. Introduction -- 2. Properties of the Core under Constant Returns -- 3. The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Finite Horizons --  
505 0 |a 4. The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Infinite Horizons -- IV. THEORIES OF EXPECTATIONS FOR N COMPETING FIRMS -- l. Introduction -- 2. Expectation Models with Quantity as the Policy Variable -- 3. Expectation Models for Price as the Policy Variable -- 4. Summary -- V. COMPETITION OR COLLUSION? -- l. Introduction -- 2. The Nature of Competition and Collusion -- 3. Equilibrium with Product Variety Illustrated for Spatial Competition -- 4. The Costs of Maintaining Collusion -- 5. Sharing the Collusive Return -- VI. THE MONOPOLY AND COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIA UNDER DYNAMIC CONDITIONS -- l. Introduction -- 2. Dynamic Demand Relations -- 3. Some Fundamentals on Optimal Policies -- 4. The Solvability of Certain Linear Equations -- 5. Properties of the Cooperative and Noncooperative Dynamic Equilibria -- 6. Conclusions -- VII. ESTIMATES OF DEMAND, PRICE POLICY, AND THE RATIO OF PRICE TO MARGINAL COST BY BRAND FOR SELECTED CONSUMER GOODS -- l. Introduction --  
505 0 |a  2. Estimates of the Demand Relation between Market Share and Prices -- 3. Estimates of the Relations among Competing Prices -- 4. Competition in a New Product -- 5. Conclusions -- VIII. SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE RETURNS TO MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES -- l. Introduction -- 2. Description of the Data and Some Simple Summary Statistics -- 3. Multiple Regression Analysis of the Census Data -- 4. An Analysis of Employment Turnover in Selected Manufacturing Industries -- 5. A Brief Survey of Findings by Other Investigators -- 6. Conclusions -- Appendix l: Estimation of Payrolls, Annual Earnings, and Employment of Nonproduction Workers -- Appendix 2: Description of the Samples -- Appendix 3: The Two-Digit Industry Effects -- Appendix 4: The Relative Size Distribution of Firms References -- Name index -- Subject Index 
650 0 |a Competition  |x Mathematical models. 
650 0 |a Prices  |x Mathematical models. 
650 0 |a Price fixing  |x Mathematical models. 
650 0 |a Game theory. 
776 0 8 |i Online version:  |a Telser, Lester G., 1931-  |t Competition, collusion, and game theory.  |d Chicago, Aldine·Atherton [1972]  |w (OCoLC)654683642 
988 |a 20020608 
906 |0 DLC 

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