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Competition, collusion, and game theory

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Telser, Lester G., 1931-
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Chicago, Aldine·Atherton [1972]
Series:Aldine treatises in modern economics
Subjects:
Competition > Mathematical models.
Prices > Mathematical models.
Price fixing > Mathematical models.
Game theory.
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Table of Contents:
  • Foreword
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • APPLICATIONS OF CORE THEORY MARKET ExCHANGE
  • l.
  • 2. Consumer Surplus and Transforable Utility
  • 3. Some Simple Trading Situations
  • 4. Owners and n Nonowners
  • 5. The Basic Core Constraints
  • 6. Market Efficiency and Honest Brokers
  • 7. Multiunit Trade
  • 8. Increasing Returns and Public Goods from the Viewpoint of the Core
  • 9. A Brief Historical Note
  • Appendix: Consumer Surplus
  • II. FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF CORE THEORY TO MARKET EXCHANGE
  • I. Introduction
  • 2. Balanced Collections of Coalitions
  • -3. Empty Cores
  • 4. The Feasibility of Trade
  • 5. Group Rationality with Multiunit Trade
  • 6. Competition and Numbers
  • 7. The Number of Traders and the Emptiness of the Core
  • 8. Conclusions
  • III. APPLICATIONS OF THE CORE TO OLIGOPOLY
  • I. Introduction
  • 2. Properties of the Core under Constant Returns
  • 3. The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Finite Horizons
  • 4. The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Infinite Horizons
  • IV. THEORIES OF EXPECTATIONS FOR N COMPETING FIRMS
  • l. Introduction
  • 2. Expectation Models with Quantity as the Policy Variable
  • 3. Expectation Models for Price as the Policy Variable
  • 4. Summary
  • V. COMPETITION OR COLLUSION?
  • l. Introduction
  • 2. The Nature of Competition and Collusion
  • 3. Equilibrium with Product Variety Illustrated for Spatial Competition
  • 4. The Costs of Maintaining Collusion
  • 5. Sharing the Collusive Return
  • VI. THE MONOPOLY AND COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIA UNDER DYNAMIC CONDITIONS
  • l. Introduction
  • 2. Dynamic Demand Relations
  • 3. Some Fundamentals on Optimal Policies
  • 4. The Solvability of Certain Linear Equations
  • 5. Properties of the Cooperative and Noncooperative Dynamic Equilibria
  • 6. Conclusions
  • VII. ESTIMATES OF DEMAND, PRICE POLICY, AND THE RATIO OF PRICE TO MARGINAL COST BY BRAND FOR SELECTED CONSUMER GOODS
  • l. Introduction
  • 2. Estimates of the Demand Relation between Market Share and Prices
  • 3. Estimates of the Relations among Competing Prices
  • 4. Competition in a New Product
  • 5. Conclusions
  • VIII. SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE RETURNS TO MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
  • l. Introduction
  • 2. Description of the Data and Some Simple Summary Statistics
  • 3. Multiple Regression Analysis of the Census Data
  • 4. An Analysis of Employment Turnover in Selected Manufacturing Industries
  • 5. A Brief Survey of Findings by Other Investigators
  • 6. Conclusions
  • Appendix l: Estimation of Payrolls, Annual Earnings, and Employment of Nonproduction Workers
  • Appendix 2: Description of the Samples
  • Appendix 3: The Two-Digit Industry Effects
  • Appendix 4: The Relative Size Distribution of Firms References
  • Name index
  • Subject Index

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